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TERRORISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE
SOLUTION-THE COMPREHENSIVE TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 19951
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the United States has been the target of various terrorist attacks, in-
cluding the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City,' the bombing of the
World Trade Center,' the attempted bombing of the United Nations Building in New
York City4 and the bombing of New York-bound Pan Am Flight #103.' These delib-
erate acts of aggression killed innocent bystanders and terrorized countless people in
the United States and beyond. It is clear that domestic terrorism is an imminent threat
to the national security of the United States and, as a result, the public is exerting pres-
sure on Congress to take action.
Throughout history, national security fears have driven our nation's leaders to
take extreme action. During World War II, Japanese-Americans were removed, relocat-
ed and placed in internment camps based on wartime suspicions. Then, in the 1960's,
the government engaged in widespread infiltration and surveillance of persons and
organizations suspected of Communist sympathies during the Cold War.6 The Ameri-
can public was angry and frustrated. In response, the government quickly acted in the
name of national security with absolute intolerance for anyone related in any way to
these abhorrent acts. Although seemingly rational in light of the passions of the times,
the government's responses injured the rights of many people. Instead of using the
deprivation of rights to punish wrongful acts, the government deprived rights based
solely on race and suspected political affiliations.
Under the laws of this country, political association and nationality are indetermi-
nate of guilt, innocence, or liability. The principle of legality' demands that "the law
1. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 141 CoNG. REc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7,
1995) (enacted by the United States Senate on June 7, 1995).
2. See David Johnston, Terror in Oklahoma City: The Investigation; at Least 30 are Dead,
Scores are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Federal Office Building,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
3. See Robert D. McFadden, Explosion at the Twin Towers: The Overview; Blast hits Trade
Center, Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands Flee Smoke in Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at
Al.
4. See Michael Isikoff & Jim McGee, 8 Foreign Nationals Accused of Plotting to Blow up U.N.,
WASH. POST, June 25, 1993, at Al.
5. See Edward Cody, Bomb Caused Pan Am Crash, British Probers Conclude; Analysis of De-
bris Suggests Plastic Explosive, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1988, at Al.
6. This surveillance operation, entitled COINTELPRO, was directed at groups opposed to the
Vietnam War, particularly Martin Luther King Jr. The FBI, led by J. Edgar Hoover, conducted this
extensive operation under the auspices of combating communism. See, e.g., CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR
HOOvER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 412, 442, 682-83 (1991).
7. "In a very wide sense, the principle of legality-the 'rule of law'-refers to and requires not
only a body of legal precepts but also supporting institutions, procedures, and values ... [including]
legal procedures ... designed to effect the protection of essential interests of individuals guaranteed
by our society through limitations on the authority of the State." (citations omitted) JEROME HALL,
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is impartially and regularly administered"8 through rational procedures which preserve
the integrity of the legal process.' Alternatively, if the judicial process lacks its essen-
tial integrity, its purposes of ascertaining the truth and determining an individual's
responsibility are undermined." The result is arbitrary punishment which serves no
other purpose than to intimidate, or terrorize. Therefore, procedural safeguards must be
provided equally for everyone to preserve the legitimacy of our legal system by pro-
viding basic due process rights to everyone," including the politically unpopular. To
best determine individual responsibility, a hearing is held in which evidence is present-
ed and refuted on both sides. 2 Such is a minimal due process of law guarantee 3
which is necessary to preserve our system of justice. As Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly
observed, "The history of liberty has largely been the history of the observance of pro-
cedural safeguards."' 4
Our government deprived many innocent people of their freedom and privacy
rights in response to timely national security concerns. But, with hindsight and less
reactionary politics, our government eventually recognized these grave injustices. The
first official recognition of these wrongs came in 1976, as a response to the widespread
infiltration and surveillance practices of the 1960's. The F.B.I. created Domestic Secu-
rity Guidelines,"' to establish standards and procedures for investigations, safeguard-
ing against further violations of innocent persons' rights to privacy. Then, in 1988,
Congress passed legislation which officially apologized and awarded nominal restitu-
tion to Japanese-Americans for the harms inflicted upon their relatives in the intern-
ment camps during World War 11.16 An important provision of this legislation antici-
pates future judgments based upon identities, not actions, of individuals and issues a
solemn warning: "[T]o discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of
civil liberties in the future."'
7
Within the existing framework of the laws of our country, and in light of lessons
learned from history, this note evaluates Congress' most recently proposed solutions to
the imminent problem of terrorism: The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995.18 This note concedes that national security concerns mandate reasonable limits
on rights of anyone suspected of terrorist activities. However, this note takes issue with
the extreme action proposed by the United States Senate and House of Representatives,
specifically directed at the expedited removal of legal aliens based upon secret allega-
tions. 9 Accordingly, Part II sets forth and analyzes this provision as it was enacted
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 27, 27 n.1 (2nd ed.) (1960).
8. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 241 (1971).
9. Id. at 239.
10. See generally id. at 235-43.
11. "The 'rule of law' requires some form of due process." Id. at 239.
12. For a discussion of the constitutional requirements for a fair hearing, including one's right to
know the evidence against them, see Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PENN. L. REV.
1264 (1975).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
15. 'See Excerpts from Attorney General's New Guidelines for F.B.L Investigations, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1983 at A12 (explaining the original 1973 F.B.I. Domestic Security Guidelines and the 1983
revisions).
16. Public Law 100-383 § 1 (1988), 102 Stat. 903, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. App. §
1989 (1990)).
17. Id. at 6.
18. S. 735, supra note 1.
19. Rather than undertake a detailed analysis of the proposed legislation in its entirety, this note
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by the United States Senate on June 7, 1995. Next, Part III summarizes the present
state of constitutional rights and procedural protections presently afforded to aliens.
Based on this foundation, Part IV undertakes a critical evaluation of the secret evi-
dence provisions in light of these rights, concluding with a workable solution.
H. CONGRESS' PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Originally introduced as part of the Clinton administration's response to the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing,' The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act focus-
es on safeguards against international terrorist threats. Despite the wholly international
focus of the legislation, it was an instance of domestic terrorism-the Oklahoma City
bombing-which created the intense political pressure on Congress to enact The Com-
prehensive Terrorism Prevention Act."
The proposed legislation creates a new special removal court to expeditiously
remove aliens22 who are legally present in the United States. An alien qualifies for
these new proceedings if he is believed to be part of an organization that has been
designated a "terrorist organization" by the Secretary of State. Under the current anti-
terrorism laws, the government possesses the power to deport any alien who engages
in or supports terrorist activity.23 Although, under current immigration law,24 classes
of aliens are simply defined as deportable,25 the proposed legislation focuses on the
deportation of a new class of aliens who are considered terrorists according to the
focuses on the provisions authorizing secret evidence to be used against an alien at a deportation hear-
ing. ("Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures," S. 735, supra note 1, Title V § 503) [hereinafter Secret
Evidence Provision].
20. The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 896, S. 390, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Most of the provisions of this bill have been adopted by the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act.
S. 735, supra note 1.
21. Shortly after the bombing in Oklahoma City, President Clinton "prodded Congress to act
swiftly on the bill, [he said] 'We must not dawdle or delay, Congress must act, and act promptly."'
CONG. Q., May 11, 1995, at 1180. In the same context, Senator Dianne Feinstien said, "I'm going to
vote for everything because I think we need to take an unparalleled step in our society to put an end
to this." CONG. Q., May 11, 1995, at 1180. Also, during the Senate floor debates on S. 735, Senators
Hatch, Dole, Specter, Lieberman, and Daschle each emphasized the need to pass this legislation with
urgency in light of the Oklahoma City Bombing. 141 CONG. REc. S7585, S7596, S7599, S7608 (daily
ed. May 26, 1995). Contra Naftali Rendavid, Of Primary Concern; Campaign Creeps Up On Senate
Crime Bill, LEGAL TIMEs, July 17, 1995 at 1 (Senator Orrin Hatch expressing concerns with the ur-
gency surrounding this legislation: "[W]e'd be better bringing [the bill] up next year . . . where we
have some time to really consider it.").
22. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8
U.S.C.S. § l101(a)(3) (1987).
23. "Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry engages in any terrorist
activity . . . is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § I105(a)(4)(B) (1995). "Terrorist activity" is defined as any
activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed and involves any of the
following, or a threat, attempt or conspiracy to do any of the following: Hijacking; threatening to kill,
injure or continue to detain another individual in order to compel another person; violently attacking
an internationally protected person; an assassination; using biological agents, chemical agents or nuclear
devices; using an explosive or firearm with the intent to endanger the safety of one or more individu-
als or to cause substantial damage to property. 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1994). Note, this defini-
tion remains intact under the proposed legislation. S. 735, supra note 1, § 303(a)(B)(ii).
24. Existing deportation proceedings are governed by 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1995) as authorized by 8
U.S.C.S. § 1252(b) (1987). See also infra Part III. B.
25. 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251(a)(4)-(7), (11), (12), (14)-(17), (18), and (19)(1987). The classes of deport-
able aliens include: Anarchists; advocates of opposition to government; affiliates of Communism; nar-
cotic drug addicts and prostitutes, among others. Ironically, this statute authorizes the deportation of an
alien who has "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion." Id. § 1251(a)(19).
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Secretary of State. Furthermore, unlike current immigration proceedings, the new spe-
cial removal court allows these aliens to be deported without being informed of the
government's evidence against them. This legislation allows the government to use
secret evidence against an alien to ultimately deport them from this country.
The secret evidence provision is the result of an attempt to reconcile two com-
peting concerns. First, Congress is concerned with safety risks which may endanger
national security, particularly retaliatory action from a terrorist group against confiden-
tial informants. Second, however, is the dual recognition that persons accused at hear-
ings have a right to confront the evidence against them. The Comprehensive Terrorism
Prevention Act purports to reach a compromise between these competing interests by
allowing the government to use secret evidence without exposing confidential informa-
tion while requiring the government to provide a summary of the classified information
to the alien.
A. The Secret Evidence Provisions of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention
Act
Less than two months after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate overwhelm-
ingly approved The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act26 upon a vote of 91
yeas to 8 nays.27 Described as "[a] bill to prevent and punish acts of terrorism,"2
this legislation purports to "add[] important tools to the Government's fight against
terrorism... in a temperate manner that is protective of civil liberties," thereby at-
tempting to reconcile these competing interests.29
The bill creates a new designation, a "terrorist organization," which is defined as
"an organization that engages in, or has engaged in, terrorist activity as designated by
the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury."3 ° Once
deemed part of any such terrorist organization, an alien is labeled an "alien terrorist"
for the purpose of the newly created "Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures."
Under the proposed Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures, a "Special Removal
Hearing" is provided for any alien who, if deported in the present fashion,3 would
"pose a risk to the national security of the United States because such proceedings
would disclose classified information."32 In these hearings, five federal judges, chosen
26. S. 735, supra note 1.
27. 141 CONG. REc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) [Rollcall Vote No. 242 Leg.].
28. 141 CONG. REC. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
29. Id. (statement of Senator Hatch).
30. S. 735, supra note 1, § 210(2)(iv) (defining terrorist organizations for the explicit purpose of
exclusion from the United States). Defining these organizations as excludable, in effect, also defines
them as deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1995) (Any excludable alien shall be immediately deported).
31. Under current law, the government may introduce classified information at deportation hear-
ings, provided it is relevant. Alternatively, the government may provide an unclassified summary of the
information whenever it can do so. Said summary should provide the alien an opportunity to offer
opposing evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)(4)(iv) (1995). Further, "[tihe Immigration Judge shall...
advise the respondent that he will have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence
against him . . . and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government" 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a).
On the other side, the alien has a right to obtain all information compiled against him except- 1) mat-
ters that are secret by executive order in the interest of national policy, and 2) matters that are "classi-
fied pursuant to such an executive order." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (1977) ("The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act").
32. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(a) & (e).
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by the Chief Justice of the United States, hear and decide these cases.3 The govern-
ment must prove their case by a clear and convincing evidence standard.34 The alien
is given the right to an attorney at the expense of the government,35 and illegally ob-
tained evidence is admissible against the alien.36
At this special removal hearing, the alien has a "reasonable opportunity to cross-
examine any witness"" except when the judge determines that to do so would dis-
close classified information.3" In such instances, a summary of the classified evidence
shall be prepared in a manner sufficient "to provide the alien with substantially the
same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the classified information." 9
If a summary of classified information does not meet this standard, then the
hearing is terminated unless the following three criteria are met:' 1) the alien's con-
tinued presence in the United States would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to
the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person; 2) any summary
prepared according to the standard above,4 if revealed, would likely cause the same
harm or injury; and 3) a summary is provided which is "adequate to allow the alien to
prepare a defense."42
B. Analysis of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act
1. Syntactical Analysis of Secret Evidence Provision
The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act provides that an alien who is
suspected of associating with a terrorist organization, and suspected of being a risk to
national security, has a right to see a summary of the government's case against him.
But, since the legislation fails to explain the scope of this right, this guarantee is hol-
low.
Before the new removal procedures are initiated, a group must be declared a
"terrorist organization."43 The importance of this determination cannot be underesti-
mated. The proposed Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act defines "terrorist orga-
33. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(c)(1).
34. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(0.
35. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(2).
36. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(4)(A)(ii) & 503(e)(4)(B). See also Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-50 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply to
current deportation proceedings).
37. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(3).
38. "The judge shall authorize the introduction in camera and ex parte of any evidence for which
the Attorney General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security of
the United States because it would disclose classified information." S. 735, supra note 1, §
503(e)(C)(5).
39. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(C)(6)(B). The Secret Evidence Provision originated as the
Specter-Simon-Kennedy Amendment for the explicit purpose of ensuring due process in deportation
proceedings. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(C)(6)(B)-(G); 141 CONG. REC. S7761-63, S7765-66,
S7773 (daily ed. June 6, 1995).
40. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E).
41. A summary of the classified evidence shall be prepared in a manner sufficient "to provide the
alien with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the classified
information." S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(B).
42. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E)(iii).
43. A "terrorist organization" is defined as "an organization that engages in, or has engaged in,
terrorist activity as designated by the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury." S. 735, supra note 1, § 210(2)(iv).
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nization" as whatever organization the Secretary of State determines has threatened, at-
tempted or conspired to commit an unlawful act." In effect, this bill affords broad,
unchecked implementation power solely to the Secretary of State, a presidentially-
appointed cabinet member.45 The requisite unlawful act is limited only to a broad
range of acts that are specified in a list of "terrorist activities."'
Although the bill fails to provide specific requirements of the summary of classi-
fied information, the scope of this provision is indicated by the actual language of the
bill. By comparing the later description of the guaranteed summary to the earlier meri-
tion of the substitute summary, the varying standards surface. The bill initially explains
that the summary of the classified information to be used against the alien shall "pro-
vide the alien with the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the
classified information." Later language clarifies that the required summary must only
be "adequate to prepare a defense."'47 The initial heightened-standard summary's rele-
vance is unclear in light of the subsequent language which guarantees only the lower-
standard summary.
The burden the government must meet before denying an alien a heightened-
standard summary, providing him with the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the classified information, is ambiguous. The criteria that must be met
before the bill permits a lower-standard summary' to be acceptable are:49 1) the
alien's continued presence in the United States would likely cause serious and irrepara-
ble harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person; and
2) any summary prepared according to the heightened standard," if revealed, would
likely cause the same harm or injury. Although the language indicates that the lower-
standard summary will be substituted only after these specific conditions are fulfilled, a
close reading of these two criteria indicates otherwise. This obscurity suggests that
these conditions could be quite easily satisfied by even a vague showing of alleged
future harm or injury, thereby indicating that the specified criteria are, in fact, quite
liberal.
The language of the secret evidence provision is confusing. The question of
whether the summary must contain painstaking details or few generalities remains
unsettled. Furthermore, the precise procedures for presenting the summary are unan-
44. See supra note 23 (defining "terrorist activity" which is incorporated as part of the "terrorist
organization" definition in S. 735).
45. The Secretary of State is required to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, another
presidentially-appointed cabinet member, before designating a group to be a "terrorist organization." S.
735, supra note 1, § 210(2)(iv).
46. The list includes any of the following, or a threat, attempt or conspiracy to do any of the
following: Hijacking; threatening to kill, injure or continue to detain another individual in order to
compel another person; violently attacking an internationally protected person; an assassination; using
biological agents, chemical agents or nuclear devices; using an explosive or firearm with the intent to
endanger the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B) (1994).
47. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(C)(6)(B) & 6(E)(iii); see supra text accompanying note 40
(explaining the thrce conditions that must be satisfied before the standard for the requisite summary is
adjusted from a heightened standard to a lower standard).
48. A lower-standard summary must only be "adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense. S.
735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E)(iii).
49. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E).
50. A heightened-standard summary of the classified evidence shall be prepared in a manner suffi-
cient "to provide the alien with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure
of the classified information." S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(B).
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swered. Whether the procedures allow oral argument over the summary or whether the
document is submitted without question is unspecified by this legislation; these ques-
tions are critical to an evaluation of the degree of rights actually afforded to the alien
in these new proceedings.
2. Legislative Intent Analysis
Although the language of this provision is vague, the Senate's intentions are
unambiguous. The Senate's intent behind the language of the new removal procedures
was to ensure 1) that aliens are informed of the charges against them, and 2) that
aliens are afforded an opportunity to confront the evidence against them. Senator Arlen
Specter, a sponsor of the bill, expressed "very grave concerns about the constitutional-
ity of any deportation proceeding in which secret evidence is used and there is not a
right of confrontation."'" To alleviate these concerns, he sponsored an amendment "to
ensure due process in deportation proceedings" which was incorporated into The Com-
prehensive Terrorism Prevention Act.52 Adding to Senator Specter's concerns, Senator
Joseph Biden denounced secret evidence provisions and praised procedural protections
while successfully urging members of the Senate to pass this legislation:
I do not think people fully understand how significant this [provision] is. [Tihe
dangers posed by secret evidence are neither hypothetical nor are they imagined.
Secret evidence runs counter to all the principles underlying due process of law and
our judicial system, and it cheapens our system by placing in doubt the accuracy of-
its decision."
To demonstrate the gravity of his concerns, Senator Biden shared a story with
his colleagues in the Senate about an American soldier's German bride. She was ex-
cluded from the United States on the grounds she was a national security risk. Initially,
the government's evidence against her was not revealed. Ultimately, when the secret
evidence was revealed it proved to be wholly unfounded. In fact, the most substantive
of the allegations were derived from an estranged lover. Once able to confront and
refute this faulty evidence, the bride was admitted to the United States.54 By telling
this story, Senator Biden illustrated the tragic consequences of depriving an accused
person the opportunity to prepare a defense through use of secret evidence which may
be uncorroborated and unreliable.
Senator Specter and Senator Biden's dissatisfaction with due process inadequa-
cies as described above were raised in objection to an early version of The Compre-
hensive Terrorism Prevention Act which did not include any provisions for a required
summary.5 In this context, the addition of any form of summary provisions constitut-
ed tantamount progress. The Senators' initial constitutional concerns were alleviated
upon passage of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act by the United States
51. 141 CONG. REc. S7760 (daily ed., June 6, 1995) (statement of Senator Specter).
52. Id. The Specter-Simon-Kennedy amendment includes the Secret Evidence Provision. See S.
735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(C)(6)(B)-(G).
53. 141 CONG. REc. S7762 (daily ed., June 6, 1995) (statement of Senator Biden).
54. Id. For the full version of Senator Biden's true story, see Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950). See also Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PENN. L. REv. 933 (1995). Although this case in-
volves exclusion, not deportation, the story illustrates the dangers of allowing the government to use
secret evidence in immigration proceedings.
55. See S. 390, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced February 10, 1995).
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Senate on June 7, 1995,56 which guarantees a summary of the classified information
to the alien.
3. Legislative Language that Conflicts with Legislative Intent
Contrary to the Senators' assurances that due process had, in fact, been satisfied,
the language of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act suggests otherwise. The
undefined standards of "injury to any person"57 and continued presence which "would
likely cause irreparable harm,"58 plus the possibility of conducting a deportation hear-
ing based upon a lower-standard summary 9 which must only meet the unspecified
criteria of "adequate to ... prepare a defense,"' create ambiguity and, therefore, di-
lute any protections set forth in the legislation. Based on this tenuous foundation, the
secret evidence provisions seem inadequate to satisfy the protections explicitly set forth
by Senator Specter and Senator Biden, should this bill become law.6 During the Sen-
ate floor debate on The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act, Senator Biden ex-
plained the injustices inflicted upon an American soldier's wife to illustrate the inher-
ent problems involved when immigration decisions are based upon secret evidence.62
Ironically, the same uncorroborated statements erroneously relied upon to exclude the
soldier's wife could be relied upon to deport legal resident aliens under the secret
evidence provision as presently drafted.
Il. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS
Immigration law was structured in light of wartime considerations, therefore
these laws antagonistically pitted United States citizens against enemy aliens.63 De-
spite changed fears, immigration law is still based on these premises, thereby resulting
in modern-day xenophobic laws. Congress granted administration and enforcement
responsibilities of immigration law to the Attorney General, who has since delegated
authority to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service." In
doing so, Congress explicitly left immigration law outside the reach of constitutional
protections.65 Therefore, because immigration law governs aliens' ability to remain in
56. S. 735, supra note 1.
57. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(6)(E)(i)(I) & 503(e)(6)(E)(ii)(ll).
58. S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(e)(6)(E)(i)(I) & 503(e)(6)(E)(ii)(I).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42 (explaining the two standards for summaries of
classified information as set forth in S. 735, supra note 1).
60. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E)(iii).
61. Perhaps to compensate for this reduction in rights, S. 735 expressly increases the alien's right
to counsel by providing a government paid attorney for the alien. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(2).
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1995) (current deportation procedures afford the alien the right to be
represented by counsel at no charge to the government).
62. Supra Part II.B.2.
63. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
64. United States Government Manual 388, 391 (1994-95).
65. The so-called Plenary Power doctrine granted full power over immigration law to the federal
government. This power is not enumerated in the Constitution. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889) (extending federal control over immigration, specifically exclusion) (often referred
to as the Chinese Exclusion case); Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1889) (extending
Chinese Exclusion to deportation proceedings); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545
(1990) (discussing the Plenary power doctrine's current vitality); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853,
861 (1987) (criticizing the oppressive nature of the Plenary Power doctrine).
[Vol. 22:103
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this country, protections of aliens' rights are less than citizens' rights under the United
States Constitution.' Nonetheless, fundamental rights of aliens are recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. 6' The following section illustrates the overall scope of
constitutional rights afforded to aliens. Then, the superseding section explains rights
presently afforded to aliens in deportation hearings under present legislation in con-
junction with standards set by the United States Supreme Court.
A. Rights Presently Afforded to Aliens
1. Varying Degrees of Aliens' Rights
In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the United States Supreme Court described the overall
realm of aliens' rights: "[T]he alien... [is] accorded a generous and ascending scale
of rights as he increases his identity with our society." The Court explained that
permitting an alien to be present in this country implies protection of that alien; this
protection does not extend to aliens who have no territorial connection with this coun-
try.69 Based on the Court's reasoning, it follows not only that aliens' rights are ac-
knowledged by the Court, but also that resident aliens are viewed under a heightened
standard as compared to non-resident aliens.7" In general, the Court demands protec-
tion of constitutional rights of aliens, not only of resident aliens, but also of non-resi-
dent and illegal aliens.7
For example, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez," the Court articulated spe-
cific outer boundaries of constitutional protections. The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect property located in a foreign country owned by a nonresi-
dent alien." The Court reasoned that because of the alien's lack of voluntary attach-
ment to the United States, and because the property involved was located in a foreign
country, the United States Constitution offered him no protection. Other examples are
the Insular Cases where the Court held that not every constitutional provision applies
to governmental activity even in geographical regions where the United States has
sovereign power. 4 "Only 'fundamental' constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhab-
66. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens").
67. This note does not address rights of illegal aliens.
68. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770.
69. Id. at 777-78.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990) (listing cases which establish
that illegal and legal aliens receive certain constitutional protections).
72. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
73. Id. at 274-75; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 763 (rejecting the extraterritorial application
of the Fifth Amendment). But see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957) ("[Clonstitutional protections
for the individual were designed to restrict the United States Government when it acts outside of this
country, as well as here at home.").
74. The Insular Cases as cited in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268, include Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable in Porto Rico); Ocampo
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment Grand Jury provision inapplicable in Philip-
pines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in Philippines);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Revenue Clauses of Constitution inapplicable to Porto Rico);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial inap-
plicable in Hawaii).
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itants of those territories. 75
In Verdugo-Urquidez and the Insular Cases, the Court articulated two important
distinctions: 1) extraterritorial from territorial rights, and 2) nonresident aliens from
resident aliens. Although the Court has been reluctant to recognize nonresident aliens'
rights in foreign countries, the Court respects the rights of resident aliens in the United
States who have demonstrated "voluntary attachment" to the United States: "Mere
lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives
him certain rights. '76 Resident aliens seem to demonstrate voluntary attachment to the
United States by residing here, thereby satisfying the Fourth Amendment test articulat-
ed in Verdugo-Urquidez. This level of protection, therefore, should readily be extended
to the more general constitutional rights. In fact, as early as 1886, the Court, reinforc-
ing this reasoning, explicitly held that the due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment77 protects resident aliens.78 The Court describes these provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment as "universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nation-
ality."79 Then, in 1896, the Court declared that aliens are entitled to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights: "[E]ven aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."8 In addition to the
Court's consistent recognition of resident aliens' due process protections, the Court
acknowledged, in 1945, that resident aliens also have First Amendment rights.8'
2. The Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights
The language of the Constitution describes the beneficiaries of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as "persons."82 In contrast, those described in the First, Sec-
ond, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments are "the people." 3Although this syntacti-
cal ambiguity is by no means conclusive, such distinctions suggest the varying scopes
of protections afforded under the Amendments. The Fifth Amendment's "person"
category is universal and inclusive, while remaining Amendments, through use of "the
people," create a more limited category.84
In 1953, the Court used this legislative construction analysis in concluding that a
75. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148).
76. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
79. Id.
80. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (This statement was made in the
context of aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.)
81. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Sixth Amendment uses the language "accused" which has
been construed similarly to "person" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
83. Id. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X.; see also id. Art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States") (em-
phasis added).
84. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66, 269; see also United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (The First Amendment does not apply to excludable alien because
he is not "one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution") (emphasis add-
ed); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at
Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 14-15 (1985).
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resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 5 thereby
reinforcing its earlier decisions extending due process to resident aliens. Furthermore,
the Court, when refusing to extend the Fourth Amendment's protections in Verdugo-
Urquidez, noted that "[the Fourth Amendment] operates in a different manner than the
Fifth Amendment."' In addition, the Court expressly noted that the Fifth Amendment
was not at issue in Verdugo-Urquidez, thereby distanced its restrictive interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment from the Fifth Amendment. These sharp distinctions reinforce
the hierarchical distinction between broad due process protections and the other consti-
tutional provisions, as indicated by their language. In sum, the Court has established
that resident aliens in the territorial United States are afforded some rights, at the very
least. Therefore, aliens must be protected by the most basic procedural shields of due
process under present law.
B. Constitutional Rights Presently Afforded to Aliens at Deportation Hearings
Since Congress explicitly left immigration law outside the reach of constitutional
protections,"' the applicability of even the most fundamental constitutional due pro-
cess protections is less clear. Furthermore, although liberty interests are at stake, de-
portation proceedings are civil, not criminal;8 therefore, the guaranteed criminal pro-
cedural protections do not apply to deportation hearings. 9
But, in 1903, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that due process
applies to aliens in the deportation context: "[T]his court has never held ... that ad-
ministrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of
law ...... ' Then, in 1993, the Court explicitly expanded this principle: "It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deporta-
tion proceedings."' Although this decision affirmed the extenuation of fundamental
procedural rights for aliens in deportation proceedings, the specific application of this
due process guarantee has been the subject of much debate.'
The United States Supreme Court extends minimal due process requirements,
specifically the right of confrontation, not only to criminal procedure, but also to ad-
ministrative and regulatory hearings.93 Due process requires an adequate hearing in-
cluding the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.9" Although
85. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) (An alien's "status as a person with-
in the meaning and protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him.").
86. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
87. Supra note 63 (discussing the Plenary Power doctrine).
88. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (no bail requirement); Trias-Hernandez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1975) (Miranda warnings are not
required).
90. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (this case is often referred to as The Japanese
Immigrant Case). But see Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707 (equating deportation powers with
exclusionary powers, describing both as "absolute and unqualified" rights of the federal government).
91. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1993); accord Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-
34 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596-97, 602.
92. See, e.g., Jim Rosenfeld, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process of Law, 26 COLM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 713 (1995) (tracing this debate from the Alien Acts of 1798 to early versions of
Congress's 1995 proposed legislation).
93. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
94. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (explaining due process requirements for an adequate
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"due process is flexible, subjective, difficult to determine," 5 the Court explicitly guar-
antees, at the very least, some degree of procedural protections to aliens in deportation
hearings. The minimum basic protection in the context of a hearing is the accused's
right to confront the evidence against him or her.' Therefore, according to the afore-
mentioned United States Supreme Court decisions, aliens must, at the very least, be
afforded the right of confrontation.
In accordance with the Court's guarantees, legislation governing present-day
deportation hearings explicitly provides the alien with the right to confront opposing
evidence.97 In addition, the alien "shall be given notice... of the nature of the charg-
es against him" ' and the alien "shall have the privilege of being represented (at no
expense to the Government) by ... counsel ... . 9 Although not expressly required
to do so under the United States Constitution, current deportation legislation provides
aliens more than the minimal due process guarantees.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TERRORISM PREVENTION
ACT IN LIGHT OF ALIENS' EXISTING RIGHTS
Congress' attempt to reconcile the competing concerns of national security risks
with aliens' right to confront evidence resulted in the secret evidence provisions. With-
out further elaboration, the language of this bill is open to varying interpretations with
varying results. Without explicit constitutional guarantees,"e aliens are susceptible to
restrictions on their rights imposed by legislation, limited only by rights explicitly
established by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the importance of proce-
dural protections afforded to aliens through legislation cannot be underestimated. The
secret evidence provisions in The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act constitute
an intolerable deprivation of procedural rights. There are two chief concerns with the
proposed Act: First, the procedures for determining who is an alien terrorist, and sec-
ond, the lower-standard summary of classified information provided to the alien to
prepare a defense. The following sections explain these concerns and then discuss the
long-term ramifications.
A. The Alien Terrorist Determination
The proposed Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act gives the Secretary of
State, a presidentially-appointed cabinet member, full discretion in defining "terrorist
organization.""'' Under the proposed Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act, an
entire group of people might be officially classified as a "terrorist organization" based
upon no more than one unlawful act committed by one of its members. As a result of
hearing for the termination of welfare benefits). But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 568-69
(1974) (limiting availability of cross-examination in prison hearings).
95. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
96. See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REV. 193,
213-14 (1956) (explaining the need for confrontation and the dangers of "faceless" informers).
97. "The Immigration Judge shall . . . advise the respondent that he will have a reasonable op-
portunity to examine and object to the evidence against him . . . and to cross-examine witnesses pre-
sented by the Government .... " 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1995).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1995).
99. Id. § 1252(b)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (alien shall be advised of available free legal
services programs).
100. See supra note 65.
101. S. 735, supra note 1, § 210(2)(iv).
[Vol. 22:103
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act
this classification, each alien member would be considered an "alien terrorist" for the
purposes of the new Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures. 2 In any circumstance
where the government has evidence, whether weighty or inadequate, indicating that an
alien is a member of an organization which the Secretary of State has declared a "ter-
rorist organization,"'' 3 the government may initiate Alien Terrorist Removal Proce-
dures against that alien. These procedures provide for the expedited removal of an
alien based on the government's secret evidence. Under this legislation, politically
unpopular groups may be singled out, and, based upon nothing more than their status
as aliens and the Secretary of State's designation of an organization to which they
belong, law-abiding resident aliens may be deported.
B. The Substitute Lower-Standard Summary
1. The New Procedure
Although it is not uncommon for some types of hearings to provide less proce-
dural safeguards than a criminal trial, the secret evidence provision, providing that a
written summary may be substituted for classified information, contains an even lower
level of protection. For example, in bail hearings, the Rules of Evidence do not apply
and hearsay evidence is admissible." 4 Although admitting hearsay evidence may lim-
it defendants' opportunities to cross-examine the evidence against them at bail hear-
ings, admitting substitute written summaries eliminates the aliens' opportunity to cross-
examine evidence against them. The opportunity to call a live witness to testify gives
criminal defendants an opportunity to challenge the witness's credibility and explore
the issue. In contrast, under the summary provision of The Comprehensive Terrorism
Prevention Act, aliens are forced to accept a summary of the evidence against them
without dispute. In effect, by allowing the government to present their entire case in a
written summary, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act nullifies the funda-
mental procedural guarantee of the right to confront opposing evidence outlined by the
United States Supreme Court" and followed in present-day legislation governing de-
portation hearings. Although the language of the secret evidence provision requires the
lower-standard summary to be adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense, the
procedures deny aliens any opportunity to confront evidence against them.
In the secret evidence provision, not only are the procedural safeguards lower
102. See also David Cole, The Politics of Crime Makes for Strange Bedfellows, CONN. L. TRIB.,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 25 (discussing early opposition to these and other similar provisions which were
later adopted by The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act).
103. This determination, which underlies the alien removal procedures, rests wholly with the Secre-
tary of State, restrained only by a "consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury." This legislation
includes no procedures by which an alien terrorist could appeal this determination. S. 735, supra note
1, § 210(2)(iv).
104. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1994). In contrast with The Comprehensive
Terrorism Prevention Act, note the increased procedural safeguards provided for defendants in bail
hearings, including: detention hearing must be prompt; findings of fact must be in writing; appellate
review is expedited; right to counsel at government's expense; and defendant's ability to cross-examine
witnesses. See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (explaining these procedural safe-
guards).
105. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (upholding the use of secret evidence in exclusion
case, but expressly stating secret evidence may not be used in deportation proceedings); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Secre-
cy is not congenial to truth-seeking .... ).
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than those provided for defendants in bail hearings, but the consequences of a deporta-
tion hearing are also more severe. Following a bail determination, the defendants are
given another opportunity to be heard, with full range of procedural protections, at a
criminal trial. In contrast, following the deportation hearing, aliens are not given an
opportunity to defend themselves; rather, they must leave the United States.
2. The Contents of the Substitute Summary
The language of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act reads as if open-
ness is the rule and secrecy is the exception, and as if heightened-standard summa-
ries" are the rule and lower-standard summaries 7 are the exception. In effect,
however, the boundless "exceptions" allow the "rules" to be circumvented with ease.
As discussed in Part II.B.1, the prerequisites which must be fulfilled before height-
ened-standard summaries are bypassed, are ambiguous and provide little protection to
the alien." s A mere recitation of even the most vague allegations seem to satisfy the
ambiguous threshold set forth in the language of this bill. As a result, the purported
rules become suggestions, dramatically lowering the standards of protection afforded to
aliens, in addition to undermining legislative intent behind this legislation.
A lower-standard summary may, in fact, allow an alien to prepare a defense, but
it does not offer the alien substantially the same ability as full disclosure of classified
information. By dramatically lowering the standard for the requisite summary, the bill
deprives aliens of the right to confront evidence against them, and leaves open the
question of whether aliens will be informed of any charges against them when they are
subject to deportation proceedings. Although this legislation specifies that the summary
presented to the alien must be "adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense,""
this legislation does not explain how, without any indication of the government's accu-
sations, an alien could possibly prepare any defense at all.
C. The Potential Ramifications of The Secret Evidence Provision
Though countless explanations for the passage of the secret evidence provisions
are feasible, none are sufficient. Perhaps due to misguided anti-terrorist passions, or
perhaps due to politics, the Senate passed a bill which potentially undermines funda-
mental procedural protections. The assurances of fairness and justice were taken away
in the name of national security, for the purposes of combating the moder-day enemy.
If history is a fair indicator, the consequences of this legislation, if enacted, will not be
widely understood until after substantial damage is done."
Despite political rhetoric to the contrary, this proposed legislation fails to guaran-
tee aliens the most fundamental due process right: The right of confrontation. Without
procedural protections, the government is free to unilaterally accuse and administer
punishment."' The persons whose rights are subject to the newfound vulnerability
106. The heightened-standard summary must "provide the alien with substantially the same ability
to make his defense as would disclosure of the classified information." S. 735, supra note 1, §
503(e)(6)(B).
107. The lower-standard summary must be "adequate to allow the alien to prepare a defense." S.
735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E)(iii).
108. For the list of these prerequisites, see supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
109. S. 735, supra note 1, § 503(e)(6)(E)(iii).
110. See supra Part I.
111. In the context of these provisions, the punishment is deportation.
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under The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act include aliens who are legally
residing in the United States. Although an argument can be made that such aliens'
rights are, and should be, less than rights of citizens, the United States Supreme Court,
as discussed earlier, has determined that aliens are afforded fundamental procedural
rights, including the right to confront evidence against them. Furthermore, permitting
an alleged terrorist to confront evidence does not undermine the government's case
against him. Alternatively, procedural protections simply ensure the innocent will not
be deported without justification from the United States government. ,2
The legal reasoning behind The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act is an
invalid syllogism. " ' The secret evidence provisions are based upon a logical fallacy:
Some terrorists are foreigners, therefore all foreigners are terrorists. Such an underly-
ing premise is not only incoherent, but also offensive to the integrity of the principle
of legality." 4 Generalizations about what people may do based solely upon their sta-
tus as an alien intimidates aliens based only upon the belief that foreigners may be
terrorists.
Terrorism is defined as the "use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce,
esp[ecially] for political purposes.""' 5 Since no legitimate goals are served by punish-
ing a person who is not culpable and did not act in violation of any laws,"6 it fol-
lows that this type of punishment is administered for the purpose of intimidating or
coercing. In other words, this legislation proposes a terrorist solution which under-
mines the impartiality and legitimacy of the rules of law." 7 The Comprehensive Ter-
rorism Prevention Act enables the government to use secret evidence in new deporta-
tion proceedings to intimidate and coerce aliens based upon ideological and political
fears of foreigners who may be terrorists. Such policy is reminiscent of Japanese-
American internment camps and widespread infiltration of organizations suspected of
Communist sympathies."' In effect, the Senate passed a bill which repeated recog-
nized historic mistakes; the Senate passed a bill which undermined the principle of
legality.
V. REDRAFING THE LEGISLATION
Although supporters of this bill assert its fairness and its effectiveness in both
combating terrorism and protecting national security, opponents remain concerned with
civil rights abuses."9 The prevention of terrorist attacks is a goal clearly supported
112. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of procedural
protections to preserve the legitimacy of our judicial system).
113. See generally, Edwin W. Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. PENN. L. REv. 875 (1942) (ap-
plying the psychology of problem-solving to legal analysis, including formal and instrumental logic).
114. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
115. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1960 (2nd. ed. 1987).
116. The legitimate goals served by punishment are prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence,
education and retribution. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 21-25
(1972).
117. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (explaining the rules of law).
118. See supra Part I (explaining instances of extreme actions taken by the United States govern-
ment in the name of national security which have since been recognized as wrong).
119. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Immigrants, Civil Libertarians Unite; Clinton Anti-Terrorism Bill
Angers Rights Groups, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at 2; Representative Schumer, Editorial: Life and
Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1995 at A33; Holly Idelson, Complaints Slow Panel Action on Anti-
Terrorism Bill, CONG. Q. WK. REP., June 19, 1995 at 1750 (discussing opposition to an earlier House
version of these provisions).
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unanimously, as are universal civil rights protections. Deportation procedures need to
be streamlined to facilitate the expedited removal of aliens who pose a legitimate
threat to the safety of the United States. But, as an appeal to fairness and principles of
legality, in addition to lessons learned from history, Congress must modify the pro-
posed secret evidence provisions which fail to distinguish between aliens and terrorists.
The best solution lies in a synthesis of the competing concerns. In light of the broader
principles at stake, the following section focuses on major pitfalls present in the pro-
posed deportation proceedings set forth in The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention
Act: 1) The definition of "terrorist organization;" 2 ' 2) the secret evidence determina-
tion; and 3) the required standard for summaries of secret evidence; and 4) the ques-
tionable right of confrontation. Each will be addressed, in turn, along with a workable
solution.
A reform of The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act must be founded on
basic notions of justice in light of the United States Constitution, lessons learned from
history, and the principles of legality.' 2' Further, such a proposal must attempt to
remedy the imminent threat of terrorism without losing sight of sensitive national
security concerns or basic procedural protections. In accordance with these objectives,
this following submission attempts to modify the Senate bill to better serve the laud-
able intentions of the Senators who.supported it.
A. Eliminate "Terrorist Organization" Determination
Under the current anti-terrorism laws, the government possesses the power to
deport any alien who engages in or supports terrorist activity.'22 Establishing a new
class of persons who are defined as deportable does not combat terrorism. Other than
facilitating guilt by association, the creation of this new class adds no new powers to
the fight against terrorists. In addition, it is important to prevent any one person, name-
ly the Secretary of State, from possessing such a concentration of power to unilaterally
declare any group to be a terrorist organization. Eliminating this determination ensures
that politically unpopular groups are not singled out under the auspices of security
risks. Eliminating this new label also ensures that aliens are not labeled "alien terror-
ists" unless they personally commit a terrorist act, not because they belong to an orga-
nization which is considered a "terrorist organization."
B. Raise the Standard for Secret Evidence Determination
Classified information must remain secret, but the government must be restrained
in some way from using it liberally against an alien, without his knowledge, at a de-
portation hearing. All evidence obtained against an alleged terrorist must be used
120. Representative Hyde, a sponsor of this legislation in the House of Representatives, "blamed
the bill's broad definition of terrorism for creating problems" passing this legislation. Stephen Labaton,
Bill on Terrorism, Once a Certainty, Derails in House, N.Y. TnIEs, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al.
121. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
122. "Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry engages in any terrorist
activity ... is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4)(B) (1994). "Terrorist activity" is defined as any
activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed and involves any of the
following, or a threat, attempt or conspiracy to do any of the following: hijacking; threatening to kill,
injure or continue to detain another individual in order to compel another person; violently attacking
an internationally protected person; an assassination; using biological agents, chemical agents or nuclear
devices; using an explosive or firearm with the intent to endanger the safety of one or more individ-
uals or to cause substantial damage to property. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1994).
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against them to prosecute them effectively. This includes classified information, but it
must only be relied upon by the government if it is corroborated and deemed reliable
by more than one judge. The problem with the language as drafted' can be reme-
died by instituting a rigorous system of checks and balances. As illustrated earlier, the
lower-standard summary, as drafted, potentially deprives the alien of any procedural
protections. To avoid this extreme infringement of rights, in all cases purporting to
involve classified information, lower-standard summaries should be limited to matters
that are 1) secret by executive order in the interest of national policy and 2) classified
pursuant to an executive order. 24 Furthermore, harsh sanctions must be imposed on
the government if it attempts to withhold evidence from aliens."2 Such threats will
force the government to reveal all that it can, instead of creating incentives for the
government to get away with as much as it can. In addition, a detailed definition of the
standards "harm to the national security" and "bodily injury to any person" are re-
quired before the lower-standard summary may be substituted. Instituting these addi-
tional safeguards will guarantee the higher-standard summary to nearly all accused
aliens. The vague standard articulated in The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act
must be replaced by a heightened standard to curb abuses. By providing the alien with
only a heightened summary, the government will no longer be able to avoid the ques-
tion of confronting witnesses.
C. Redraft the Summary Provisions.
Raising the standards for defining a "terrorist organization," providing the alien
with the right to confrontation, and raising the standard of "secret evidence" will im-
prove the application of the Senate bill. Most importantly, the language authorizing the
summary provisions must be reformed. As discussed earlier, the Senate's legislation
requires the alien to be presented with an unclassified summary, in lieu of mandatory
disclosure of classified information. The summary must be sufficient to 1) inform the
alien of the nature of the evidence against him, and 2) provide the alien with substan-
tially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the classified infor-
mation. If the higher-standard summary was the rule and the lower-standard summary
was the rare exception, as intended by Senator Specter and Senator Biden, this provi-
sion would deprive a smaller group of aliens their rights to confront the evidence
against them. The minimal threshold present in The Comprehensive Terrorism Preven-
tion Act, the standard which renders the potential of stripping aliens of all procedural
rights, must be resorted to only sparingly.
D. Provide the Alien with the Right of Confrontation.
As discussed in Part III, aliens are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Although the precise scope of this protection remains unclear, the
United States Supreme Court has assured them at least a minimal degree of protection.
123. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining the problems with the summary provisions).
124. Institute a definition of classified information similar to the one articulated as an exception to
The Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) (1977).
125. For similar sanctions imposed on the government for violations of Classified Information Pro-
cedures Act (C.I.P.A), see 18 U.S.C. App. IV § 1 (1995). Compare S. 735, supra note 1, §§ 503(D)-
(E) (giving the government a second chance to draft an acceptable summary, then, upon second failure,
proceeding under a lower-standard summary).
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The most basic of these protections is the right of confrontation. Affording such a
basic procedural safeguard to aliens will not only protect the innocent alien, but will
also preserve the integrity of our legal system. In addition to eliminating any tempta-
tion to abuse deportation powers, affording procedural safeguards will reinforce public
confidence in our system of justice. The alien will be provided this right if the afore-
mentioned proposals are adopted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City was a horrific tragedy;
the perpetrators must be punished to the full extent of the law. However, during the
emotional times following such a disaster, we must be cautious to avoid far-reaching
legislative remedies which often result in unintended harms inflicted on innocent per-
sons. In a rush to respond to the bombing, the Senate passed legislation which tram-
ples the rights of law-abiding resident aliens. The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention
Act should not be adopted without substantial revisions as discussed above. The
government's case against an alleged terrorist will not be undermined if he is permitted
to confront the government's evidence against him. Supporters of this legislation are
rightfully concerned about the consequences of revealing classified information. But,
opponents of this legislation are equally concerned about the far-reaching effects of
stripping fundamental rights from an entire group of people. Congress would be un-
wise to disregard their own codified warning "to discourage the occurrence of similar
injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future"''2 6 based upon popular fears
and stereotypes. As discussed above, a workable compromise can be attained without
further endangering informants, without facilitating terrorist groups and without violat-
ing the principle of legality.
Melissa A. O'Loughlin*
126. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (statute authorizing nominal reparations to Japa-
nese-Americans for civil liberties violations).
* B.S., Political Science, Santa Clara University, 1993; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School,
1997.
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